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Abstract 
In a recent article entitled “The problem of molecular structure just is the measurement 
problem”, Alexander Franklin and Vanessa Seifert argue that insofar as the quantum 
measurement problem is solved, the problems of molecular structure are resolved as well. The 
purpose of the present article is to show that such a claim is too optimistic. Although the 
solution of the quantum measurement problem is relevant to how the problem of molecular 
structure is faced, such a solution is not sufficient to account for the structure of molecules as 
understood in the field of chemistry. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the hottest topics in the philosophy of chemistry is the relation between chemistry and 
physics. In this context, the central role is played by the problem of molecular structure, 
consisting in the fact that the spatial features of the molecule find no comfortable place in the 
theoretical framework of quantum mechanics. Some authors seem to retain an ontologically 
reductionistic view by conceiving the problem as the result of deep epistemic limitations 
(Sutcliffe and Woolley 2011, 2012a) or of an inadequate formulation of the issue (Hettema 
2012). Others consider that quantum decoherence supply the reduction link between classical 
molecular chemistry and the quantum realm (Trost and Hornberger 2009, Scerri 2011, 2013). 
From a different view, it has been claimed that molecular structure cannot be strictly 
explained by quantum mechanics (Primas 1983, 1998, Amann 1992, Martínez González et al 
2019), even when decoherence is taken into account (Fortin et al. 2106). Nevertheless, this 
limitation is not always interpreted in the same way. For some authors, the impossibility of 
strict explanation is a manifestation of the merely approximate character of the concept of 
molecular structure when confronted with the precise quantum description (Woolley 1978, 
1982, Bader 1990, 2011). Others, by contrast, take an ontologically non-reductionist stance 
and conceive the case of molecular structure as an example of ontological emergence (Hendry 
1998, 2004, 2008, 2010, Matta et al. 2020). 
In a recent article entitled “The problem of molecular structure just is the measurement 
problem”, Alexander Franklin and Vanessa Seifert (2020) consider the problem of molecular 
structure from a different perspective. By analyzing three particular manifestations of the 
issue, they “argue that these problems are just special cases of the measurement problem of 
quantum mechanics: insofar as the measurement problem is solved, the problems of 
molecular structure are resolved as well” (2020, Abstract). The purpose of the present paper is 
to show that such a claim is too optimistic. Of course, the solution of the quantum 
measurement problem is highly relevant to how the problem of molecular structure is faced. 
However, the mere solution of the measurement problem is not sufficient to account for the 
particular geometrical features of the molecule. In order to argue in this sense, the article is 
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organized as follows. In Section 2, the problem of quantum measurement will be revisited. 
Then, the three problems as presented in Franklin and Seifert’s paper will be considered: 
enantiomers and Hund’s paradox (Section 3), isomers and the inability of resultant 
Hamiltonians to determine molecular structure (Section 4), and symmetry breaking (Section 
5). Some final remarks (Section 6) will close the argumentation. 
2. The quantum measurement problem 
As it is well known, the measurement problem is the most discussed topic in the debates 
about the interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to the standard von Neumann 
model (see, e.g., Myrvold 2018), a quantum measurement is conceived as an interaction 
between a system S , corresponding to the Hilbert space S , and a measuring apparatus M , 
corresponding to the Hilbert space M . Before the interaction, M  is prepared in a ready-to-
measure state 0 Mp  , eigenstate of the pointer observable P̂  of M . The apparatus is 
constructed in such a way that the interaction establishes a correlation between the eigenstates 
i Sa   of an observable Â  of S  and the eigenstates i Mp   of the observable P̂  of 
M : 
0i i ia p a p   .        (1) 
Now let us suppose that the system S  is prepared in a superposition of the eigenstates of Â , 
i ii
c a , where at least two of the ic  are nonzero. If the evolution of this state is the linear 
Schrödinger evolution, the resulting process is  
0 0 1i i i i ii i
c a p c a p        ,     (2) 
with 0 1, S M     The measurement problem consists in explaining why, being the 
post-experimental state 1  a superposition of the i ia p , the pointer P̂  acquires a 
definite value, say, its eigenvalue kp  corresponding to its eigenstate kp . 
This formulation of the measurement problem rests on three implicit assumptions: that 
the state of a system specifies the properties of the system, that the state evolution is linear, 
and that the measuring apparatus’ pointer acquires a single definite value. On this basis, Tim 
Maudlin (1995) presents what he calls “the problem of outcomes” in the following terms: 
“1.A The wave-function of a system is complete, i.e. the wave-function specifies 
(directly or indirectly) all of the physical properties of a system.  
 1.B The wave-function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical 
equation (e.g. the Schrödinger equation). 
 1.C Measurements of, e.g., the spin of an electron always (or at least usually) 
have determinate outcomes, i.e., at the end of the measurement the measuring 
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device is either in a state which indicates spin up (and not down) or spin down 
(and not up).” (Maudlin 1995: 7). 
In that same paper, Maudlin mentions other two problems involved in quantum measurement: 
“the problem of statistics”, related to the fact that initial states sometimes lead to different 
outcomes, whose probabilities are given by the Born rule, and “the problem of effect”, 
concerning the correlations between the outcomes of successive measurements. Although 
relevant, these two issues will not be considered here because they do not directly concern the 
present argumentation. 
Nevertheless, a further aspect of quantum measurement needs to be taken into account 
when the phenomenon of decoherence enters the stage. One of the first papers in which 
Wojciech H. Zurek introduces his notion of environment-induced decoherence is entitled 
“Pointer basis of quantum apparatus: Into what mixture does the wave packet collapse?” 
(Zurek 1981). This question reappears in subsequent papers:  
“In the real world, even when we do not know the outcome, we do know what the 
alternatives are, and we can safely act as if only one of them has already occurred. 
[…] But how can an observer who has not yet consulted the detector express his 
ignorance about the outcome without giving up his certainty about the "menu" of 
the possibilities?” (Zurek 1991: 38). 
On the basis of Zurek’s remarks, in his detailed study of the conceptual meaning of 
decoherence Maximilian Schlosshauer (2004: 1270) distinguishes two problems regarding 
quantum measurement. The first one is the problem of definite outcomes: why do 
measurements have outcomes at all?, why do we perceive a definite value of the pointer and 
not a superposition of its values? This is the traditional problem as presented in the von 
Neumann model of measurement and corresponds to Maudlin’s problem of outcomes. But the 
second problem is as relevant as the first one, and is logically previous. The problem of the 
preferred basis derives from the fact that the expansion of the post-experimental state is in 
general not unique and, therefore, neither the measured observable nor the apparatus’ pointer 
are uniquely defined. In other words, in eq. (2) the state 1  can be expressed as a 
superposition of states belonging to many ‒in principle infinite‒ different bases of the Hilbert 
space S M : why the measurement outcome corresponds to the basis defined by 
measuring apparatus’ pointer? Schlosshauer agrees with many other authors in that 
decoherence does not solve the problem of definite outcomes (see, e.g., Healey 1995, Bub 
1997, Pearle 1997, Joos 2000, Adler 2003, Zeh 2003, Bacciagaluppi 2020), but plays a central 
role in the solution of the problem of the preferred basis: “the preferred basis is not chosen in 
an ad hoc manner simply to make our measurement records determinate or to match our 
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experience of which physical quantities are usually perceived as determinate […]. Instead the 
selection is motivated on physical, observer-free grounds” (Schlosshauer 2004: 1280; some 
authors even question the role of decoherence in the selection of the preferred basis, see 
Castagnino and Fortin 2011, 2012). 
In their paper, Franklin and Seifert explicitly identify the problem of quantum 
measurement with Maudlin’s problem of outcomes. Nevertheless, as explained in the 
following sections, the problem of the preferred basis must also be considered when the 
account of molecular structure is addressed from the viewpoint of quantum mechanics. 
3. Enantiomers and Hund’s paradox 
As it is well known, enantiomers, also known as optical isomers, are chiral molecules: each 
member of a pair of enantiomers is not superimposable on its mirror image. The difficulty to 
explain optical isomerism in quantum terms was already pointed out by Friedrich Hund 
(1927): chiral states are not eigenstates of the Hamiltonian of the molecule since it is invariant 
under spatial reflection; so, why do certain chiral molecules display an optical activity that is 
stable in time, associated to a well-defined chiral state?  
Let us consider Hund’s paradox in formal terms. The total or “resultant” Hamiltonian 
RĤ  (also called “Coulomb Hamiltonian”, see Sutcliffe and Woolley 2012b, 2014) of any 
molecule takes into account all the interactions among nuclei, among electrons and among 
electrons and nuclei. Such interactions endow the Hamiltonian with certain symmetries, 
which are inherited by its eigenstates (see Woolley 1976). Since the Coulombic interaction 
only depends on the distance between the interacting particles, the Hamiltonian RĤ  is 
symmetric under spatial reflection; therefore, it commutes with the parity operator P̂ : 
0R
ˆ ˆP,H    . As a consequence, the eigenstates n  of RĤ  have parity symmetry: 
ˆ
n nP     . In particular, the ground state 0  is parity symmetric: 
0 0P̂    .           (3) 
Moreover, this feature is preserved during the time evolution of the system because the parity 
operator commutes with the Hamiltonian RĤ  and, as a consequence, is a constant of motion. 
However, experimentally isomers are not found in states with parity symmetry. In fact, if the 
two chiral states are represented by the quantum states L  (left-handed) and R  (right-
handed), the structure of each isomer is the mirror image of the structure of the other: 
ˆ ˆP L R P R L  .         (4) 
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Therefore, the states L  and R  cannot be eigenstates of the parity-symmetric Hamiltonian 




L R   .          (5) 
As Franklin and Seifert correctly point out, it is easy to conceive Hund’s paradox as a 
case of the quantum measurement problem: here the issue is to account for the transition from 
the superposition to one of the chiral states, L  or R  (see Fortin et al. 2016, 2018). 
Therefore, once the quantum measurement problem is solved, Hund’s paradox is solved too. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial not to extrapolate this conclusion to the problem of molecular 
structure, which consists in explaining the geometrical shape of the molecule in quantum 
terms. Solving the problem of molecular structure requires that the quantum state 
‒approximately‒ describes, at least, the positions of all the nuclei in the molecule. But this 
description is not given by the states L  and R . Let us consider this point carefully. 
As explained in the previous section, the quantum measurement problem consists in 
explaining why the pointer P̂  acquires a definite value even if the post-experimental state 
1  is a superposition (see eq. (2)). Let us suppose that, via some interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, one can solve the measurement problem by explaining that the state of the 
composite system S M  becomes a particular component of the superposition, say, 
k ka p  and, as a cosequence, the pointer observable P̂  acquires its definite eigenvalue 
kp . However, this does not mean that the state kp  defines the values of all the microscopic 
observables of the measuring apparatus. In fact, in practice the apparatus is a macroscopic 
system, with a huge number of quantum degrees of freedom represented in his Hilbert space 
M . So the pointer P̂  cannot define a basis of M : P̂  cannot have a so huge number of 
eigenvalues because the experimental physicists have to be able to discriminate among them. 
This means that, in general, the pointer P̂  is a “collective observable” (see Omnés 1994, 
1999), that is, a highly degenerate observable whose non-unidimensional eigenprojectors 
introduce a sort of “coarse-graining” on M . As a consequence, the definite value of P̂  does 
not imply the definite-valuedness of all the microscopic observables of the apparatus.  
A situation analogous to that described above in the case of the pointer of the apparatus 
is that occurring in the case of the observable corresponding to chirality in the molecule. On 
the one hand, the chiral molecule has many degrees of freedom represented in its resultant 
Hilbert space m , in particular, the quantum degrees of freedom related to the observables 
R̂  corresponding to the positions of the nuclei. On the other hand, in this case the eigenstates 
of the apparatus’ pointer P̂  are correlated with the eigenstates L  and R  of the “chirality” 
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observable Ĉ , whose eigenvalues r and l represent the properties of right-handedness and 
left-handedness respectively (see Fortin et al. 2018). With its two eigenvalues, Ĉ  is also a 
highly degenerate “collective observable” in m , whose definite value ‒explained by solving 
the quantum measurement problem‒ still says nothing about the definite ‒or almost definite‒ 
values of the nuclei’s positions R̂ . Broadly speaking, there are many different ways to being 
a chiral molecule: many different geometrical configurations of the nuclei can realize, say, a 
left-handed molecule. This means that solving the measurement problem involved in Hund’s 
paradox amounts to explaining the chiral nature of the molecule, but is still far from solving 
the problem of the molecular structure as a whole. 
Summing up, it is clear that Hund’s paradox is closely related with the problem of 
molecular structure. Moreover, we agree with Franklin and Seifert about understanding 
Hund’s paradox as a case of the quantum measurement problem: solving the latter one solves 
the first one. But solving Hund’s paradox does not offer yet a full answer to the problem of 
molecular structure.  
4. Isomers and resultant Hamiltonian 
In the discussions about the problem of molecular structure, it is usual to distinguish between 
the complete and the electronic Hamiltonians or, following Robin Hendry terminology, 
between the resultant and the configurational Hamiltonians of the molecule.  
As said in the previous section, the resultant Hamiltonian expresses the Coulombic 
interactions between all the nuclei and electrons composing the molecule, conceived as 
quantum entities. In formal terms, it can be written as 
         R N NN e i ee i eN iˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆH T P V R T p V r V r ,R       ,    (6) 
where NT̂  is the nuclear kinetic energy (function of the nuclear momenta P̂ ), NNV̂  is the 
potential due to the interactions between the nuclei (function of the nuclear positions R̂ ), eT̂  
is the electronic kinetic energy (function of the electronic momenta ip̂ ), eeV̂  is the potential 
due to the interactions between the electrons (function of the electronic positions îr ), and eNV̂  
is the potential due to the interactions between the electrons and the nuclei (function of the îr  
and the R̂ ). If the nuclei are conceived as fixed at definite position, they lose their quantum 
character: the now classical nuclear kinetic energy NT  is zero, and the nuclear positions are 
no longer represented by quantum operators R̂  but are given by classical parameters R . In 
turn, the classical nuclear kinetic energy  nT P , now function of the classical nuclear 
momenta P , is zero, and the classical nuclear potential  nnV R  is just a constant that shifts 
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the eigenvalues of the new Hamiltonian only by some constant amount and, therefore, can be 
neglected. As a result, the electronic Hamiltonian turns out to be 
       e e i ee i eN i e iˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆH T p V r V r , H r ,    R R .     (7) 
With this Hamiltonian the time-independent Schrödinger equation results 
       e i n i n n iˆ ˆ ˆ ˆH r , r , E r ,     R R R R ,      (8) 
where the  n îr ,  R  are the electronic eigenstates and the  nE R are the electronic 
eigenvalues for fixed R , with 0n   corresponding to the electronic ground state. If this 
calculation is repeated by varying R , an effective potential  nE R  is obtained, where now 
the R  are no longer parameters but variables; on  nE R  electrons supposedly move. So, 
for the nuclear degrees of freedom, a nuclear Hamiltonian NnĤ  for the 
thn  effective potential 
can be constructed by turning back the nuclear positions into operators: 
     Nn N nˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆH R T P E R    .        (9) 
Now, an effective or configurational Hamiltonian of the molecule can be defined as 
     C i e i Nnˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆH r ,R H r , H R   R ,       (10) 
which is no longer Coulombic and, as a consequence, does not have the same symmetries as 
the resultant Hamiltonian: “the conventional product of the electronic wavefunctions (from 
the clamped-nuclei Hamiltonian) and associated nuclear wavefunctions lack the symmetry 
properties of Coulomb Hamiltonian eigenfunctions and this difference has not been 
explained.” (Sutcliffe and Woolley 2021: forthcoming). 
The use of the BOA is pervasive in quantum chemistry, and this fact must not be 
questioned: its justification relies in its own success. Here the question is how the entire 
strategy is viewed from the perspective of quantum mechanics. 
The first point to notice is that, from the viewpoint of quantum mechanics, each 
quantum system has its own Hamiltonian: changing the Hamiltonian amounts to changing the 
identity of the quantum system itself. So, if one decides to replace a set of the variables by 
fixed numbers and associate these numbers with infinite mass and the same charge as the 
variables replaced had, one gets a new problem (Sutcliffe and Woolley, personal 
communication). As a consequence, strictly peaking, the only Hamiltonian of the quantum 
molecule is the resultant one. The configurational Hamiltonian corresponds to a different 
quantum system: a system of quantum electrons interacting between them and moving in an 
effective non-Coulombic potential. Therefore, the configurational Hamiltonian not merely 
“impose certain restrictions on the behaviour of these particles [the entities that comprise the 
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molecule]” (Franklin and Seifert 2020: 8-9): the interactions between the entities that 
comprise the molecule change their very nature and, as a consequence, the quantum system 
described by the configurational Hamiltonian is not the same as that described by the resultant 
Hamiltonian. Franklin and Seifert are right when they say that “[a]fter applying the BO 
approximation one can, in principle, formulate quantum descriptions for all the possible fixed 
positions of the nuclei.” (2020: 11). However, they add: “Each assignment of positions to 
nuclei corresponds to different quantum states of the system” (2020: 11). The question is: 
what system? In fact, the system corresponding to the configurational Hamiltonian is no 
longer the quantum molecule ‒the system composed of quantum nuclei and quantum 
electrons with Coulombic interactions‒, but a system constituted by quantum electrons and 
semi-classical nuclei in an effective Born-Oppenheimer potential.  
The second point is how to understand the “clamped nuclei” strategy, which is the core 
of the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, from the viewpoint of quantum mechanics. The 
problem of its justification in quantum terms will be not treated here because it has been 
discussed in detail elsewhere (Lombardi and Castagnino 2010). Nevertheless, it cannot be 
ignored that assuming the nuclei to be placed at rest at definite positions contradicts the 
Heisenberg principle. Somebody might retort that the nuclear kinetic energy  nˆ ˆT P  tends to 
zero because the nuclear masses tend to infinite (when compared with electronic masses) and 
not because the nuclear momenta tend to zero; then, it is not necessary to suppose that the 
nuclei are at rest. However, from a strict quantum perspective, if the positions R̂  of the 
nuclei have precise values, the values of the momenta P̂  are completely indefinite. In other 
words, assuming that the nuclei are placed at definite positions and that the values of their 
momenta are bounded to meaningfully make that  nˆ ˆT P  tends to zero also contradicts the 
Heisenberg principle, which establishes a finite bound to the corresponding uncertainties. 
Therefore, the BOA not only “simply assume the facts about molecular structure that ought to 
be explained” (Hendry 2010: 186). It also introduces a counterfactual approximation (see 
Bruer 1982, Rohrlich 1989), which, by contrast with a factual approximation, contradicts a 
postulate of the theory. A counterfactual approximation is legitimate only if it can be replaced 
by a factual approximation; for example, in special relativity the counterfactual limit c   
is legitimate because it can be replaced by a factual limit 0v c  , that is, an approximation 
for velocities v  much lower than the speed of light c . But the BOA, which leads to supplant 
the quantum nuclear positions R̂  by the classical nuclear positions R , cannot be replaced 
by any factual approximation in the context of quantum mechanics. Hasok Chang clearly 
makes the point:  
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“In this «clamping-down» approximation, the atomic nuclei are treated essentially 
as classical particles; […] this picture is non-quantum in a very fundamental way 
as the simultaneous assignment of fixed positions and fixed momenta (namely, 
zero) to them violates the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. But without such 
classical scene-setting, the quantum calculations are quite impossible. 
The difficulty here is not only about the practicalities of calculation, and the 
clamping-down of nuclei is not merely an approximation. Aside from assuming 
that the nuclei are fixed, it is necessary to know where exactly the nuclei in 
question should be placed. Otherwise it is not possible to specify the potential 
function, which needs to be inserted into the Schrödinger equation, whose 
solution determines the wavefunction of the electrons in the molecule.” (Chang 
2015: 198). 
(for a detailed discussion of the qualitative difference between classical identifiable nuclei and 
nuclei as quantum entities, see Sutcliffe and Woolley 2012b, 2014). 
The appeal to the configurational Hamiltonian, obtained through the BOA, is due to the 
fact that the resultant Hamiltonian is unable to account for the asymmetry of certain 
molecules. In particular, it cannot distinguish among different isomers: since they are 
quantum systems with the same number and types of elements, isomers are described by the 
same resultant Hamiltonian. By contrast, “one can understand the role of the configurational 
Hamiltonian as picking out that structure which agrees with the result of a particular 
measurement.” (Franklin and Seifert 2020: 20). According to the authors, “[e]ven though a 
resultant Hamiltonian does not determine the molecular structure that is identified empirically 
(that is, by measurement), it nevertheless, at least in principle, determines all possible 
structures of the examined molecule” (2020: 20), and the reason is that “the system is in a 
superposition of such [molecular] configurations.” (2020: 21). Does it mean that the ground 
state of the resultant Hamiltonian is the superposition of the ground states of the 
configurational Hamiltonians corresponding to the different isomeric configurations? Of 
course, not. As explained above, the resultant Hamiltonian RĤ  is the quantum Hamiltonian of 
the molecule, whereas the configurational Hamiltonians describe different systems, resulting 
from the application of the semiclassical BOA. So, it is difficult to see how the ground state 
of a system turns out to be the superposition of the ground states of different systems. 
With all that said, let us forget the configurational Hamiltonian and focus on the 
resultant Hamiltonian. Let us consider the idea that “that the ground state wavefunction of the 
resultant Hamiltonian corresponds to a superposition of all the different isomers.” (Franklin 
and Seifert 2020: 12) and express it in formal terms. The resultant Hamiltonian defines its 
eigenstates n  and eigenvalues nE , R n n nĤ E   , with n m e N    , and 
the ground state is the resultant Hamiltonian’s eigenstate 0  corresponding to the minimum 
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energy value 0E . Now, we are said that we can conceive 0  as a superposition of the states 
i  corresponding to the different isomers,  
0 i i
i
c   .         (11) 
According to Franklin and Seifert, the experimental identification of a particular isomer is a 
quantum measurement process that “selects” one of the components from the whole 
superposition; therefore, solving the quantum measurement problem implies solving the 
problem of the molecular structure in the case of isomers. The idea is certainly very ingenious, 
but it needs to be analyzed with care. 
A point to be noticed here is that the authors conceive the measurement problem as the 
problem of ‒definite‒ outcomes. However, the problem of the preferred basis must also be 
taken into account. In fact, the Hilbert space m  has infinite basis, and the ground state 0  
can be expressed as a superposition of the members of any of them: why the measurement 
outcome corresponds to the basis constituted by the i  and not to any other basis? The 
answer to this question can be given by appealing to the interaction of the molecule with the 
environment; this point will be considered in the next section. Here it is sufficient to stress 
that conceiving the problem of molecular structure in the case of isomers as a case of the 
quantum measurement problem also requires solving the preferred basis problem, and not 
only the problem of definite outcomes. 
Granted that the previous considerations have been taken into account, a further issue 
comes to the fore, which threatens Franklin and Seifert’s claims. The resultant Hamiltonian 
RĤ  of the molecule has certain symmetries regarding the nuclear degrees of freedom that are 
necessarily inherited by its eigenstates, in particular, by the ground state 0 . On the other 
hand, in general the isomeric structures, given the positions of their nuclei, break at least some 
of those symmetries; therefore, the i  corresponding to the different isomeric structures do 
not have all the symmetries of RĤ . It is precisely for this reason that some authors consider 
that there is an in-principle obstacle to account for molecular structure exclusively in quantum 
terms (see e.g. Woolley 1978, 1998, Hendry 2010). Pierre Claverie and Simon Diner (1980), 
in a paper repeatedly referred to by Franklin and Seifert, clearly summarize the problem as 
understood by Guy Woolley:  
“It is not possible to associate a definite molecular structure with a molecule 
described by an exact (time independent) eigenstate of the complete molecular 
Hamiltonian. By complete, we mean that all kinetic and potential terms are kept 
for all particles, electrons and nuclei as well, and that consequently the 
corresponding eigenfunctions are functions of all electronic and nuclear 
coordinates. Basically, Woolley argues that the symmetry inherent in this 
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complete Hamiltonian as concerns the nuclei (rotational symmetry, reflection 
symmetry, permutational symmetry for identical nuclei), which is necessarily 
reflected in the eigenfunctions (notably the ground state one), precludes the 
existence of a «molecular structure».” (Claverie and Diner 1980: 58; italics in the 
original). 
As already explained, the solution offered by Franklin and Seifert relies on conceiving the 
symmetric ground state 0  as a superposition of the asymmetric i  corresponding to the 
different isomeric structures. But it must be stressed that, in order to recovering the symmetry 
of 0  from the superposition of the asymmetric i , it is necessary to include all the 
mathematically possible isomeric structures in the superposition, that is, all the 
mathematically possible nuclear configurations, with the same probability. In other words, in 
eq. (11), the i  must represent all the possible relative positions of the nuclei ‒besides all 
the possible electronic configurations‒ and all the coefficients ic  must be equal: it is only by 
superposing all possible asymmetries with equal weight that a symmetry can be reconstructed. 
This theoretical fact should be empirically reflected by obtaining ‒at least, approximately‒ all 
the possible nuclear configurations with the same frequency in effective experiments. The 
problem is that this is not the case: given the number and the types of the elements composing 
a molecule, in general only few nuclear configurations are experimentally measured, that is, 
only few isomers are considered effectively “real”. Of course, there are many chemical 
reasons for the existence of certain isomers and not of others. But, from the viewpoint of 
quantum mechanics the question is: Why certain isomeric structures are obtained in 
laboratory, and not all those necessary to reconstruct the symmetry of the ground state? This 
question is at the core of the problem of molecular structure, and it is not answered by solving 
the quantum measurement problem precisely because its answer is necessary to formulate the 
problem of molecular structure as a case of the quantum measurement problem. 
Finally, let us suppose that the above problem could be solved and one of the 
asymmetric i , representing a “real” isomer, were obtained; this would be a Pyrrhic victory. 
In fact, in Franklin and Seifert’s argument, the ground state 0  is a non-trivial 
superposition of the i ; as a consequence, the i  are not eigenstates of the resultant 
Hamiltonian RĤ  of the molecule. This means that, even if immediately after measurement the 
molecule is, say, in the particular state k , at subsequent times it will evolve to different 
states according to the ‒time-dependent‒ Schrödinger equation. By contrast, in chemistry it is 
assumed that structure is a stable property of the molecule, at least stable enough as to be 
described in terms of the geometrical arrangement of the nuclei which can be measured with 
great precision. As Claverie and Diner explicitly stress: 
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“How can we explain that, in the course of time, these [initial localized] states 
retain their localized character?  […] even if we are prepared to concede that the 
"localized" state, different from the molecular eigenstates, has been created by this 
interaction, […] the molecular Hamiltonian alone is unable to maintain this 
"localized" character in the course of time.” (Claverie and Diner 1980: 68). 
The stability of molecules that are not in the ground state of the resultant Hamiltonian cannot 
be easily explained exclusively in quantum terms: this is a central aspect of the problem of 
molecular structure that is not related with the quantum measurement problem, at least in 
Maudlin’s version. 
Franklin and Seifert “argue that the apparent in-principle inability of resultant 
Hamiltonians to determine observed structure is a special case of the measurement problem, 
and that it is resolved by putative resolutions of the measurement problem.” (2020: 9). The 
above discussion about the case of isomerism shows that this is a hasty conclusion: there are 
aspects of the problem of molecular structure that are not captured by the problem of quantum 
measurement as the authors present it. 
5. Symmetry breaking 
Franklin and Seifert say that, when compared with the two previous problems, the issue of 
symmetry breaking “is less often considered as a «problem of molecular structure».” (2020: 
13). However, as they themselves notice, symmetry breaking was seriously discussed by the 
authors who most dealt with the problem of molecular structure. Following Guy Woolley and 
Brian Sutcliffe (1977), Hendry (2010) clearly characterizes what he calls “the symmetry 
problem”: since the interactions embodied in the resultant Hamiltonian of the molecule are 
Coulombic, the solutions of the Schrödinger equation (the eigenstates of the resultant 
Hamiltonian) are rotationally symmetric; however, the rotational asymmetry of polyatomic 
molecules is essential in the explanation of their chemical behavior (see also Sutcliffe and 
Woolley 2012a). As Hendry stresses, in the quantum domain no directional property can be 
assigned to an isolated molecule in an eigenstate of the resultant Hamiltonian. For example, 
the hydrogen chloride molecule has an asymmetrical charge distribution that explains its 
acidic behavior and its boiling point; however, according to quantum mechanics, the 
expectation value of the electric dipole moment of the molecule in an arbitrary eigenstate of 
the resultant Hamiltonian is always zero: “the acidic behaviour of the hydrogen chloride 
molecule is conferred by its asymmetry”, but “the asymmetry is not conferred by the 
molecule’s physical basis according to physical laws” (Hendry 2010: 186, see also Hendry 
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1998; for a precise account of the experimental distinction between polar and non-polar 
molecules, see Woolley 1976). 
Instead of considering the case of hydrogen chloride, Franklin and Seifert appeal to the 
example of the ammonia molecule, whose tetrahedral structure ‒with the negative nitrogen in 
one of the vertices and the positive hydrogens in the other three‒ accounts for its electric 
dipole moment. They rely on the explanation given by Philip Warren Anderson: since no 
stationary state of the molecule can have a nonzero value of the electric dipole moment, the 
molecule “oscillates” between two asymmetric states: “By means of quantum mechanical 
tunneling, the nitrogen can leak through the triangle of hydrogens to the other side […] A 
truly stationary state can only be an equal superposition of the unsymmetrical pyramid and its 
inverse.” (Anderson 1972: 394). Anderson’s explanation appeals to the so-called nitrogen 
inversion or umbrella inversion: a fluxional process by which the nitrogen “moves” through 
the plane formed by the hydrogens and the molecule “turns inside out” (nitrogen inversion is 
not exclusive of ammonia, but is characteristic of other kinds of molecules). However, it is 
quite clear that this is a semi-classical explanation, since already assumes the geometrical 
structure of the molecule: at each time the positions of the nuclei are definite and, as a 
consequence, the molecule has a precise shape. Therefore, it cannot be used in the context of 
the problem of accounting for molecular structure in quantum terms. 
Franklin and Seifert notice that “Anderson’s account of symmetry breaking is hardly 
mentioned in the literature on the problems considered in sections 2.1-2.2 above [those 
discussed in Sections 3 and 4 of the present paper], though a notable exception is Claverie and 
Diner (1980).” (2020: 15). But in that paper Claverie and Diner explicitly stress that this kind 
of explanation is not quantum; let us consider what they say about Anderson’s account of 
symmetry breaking:  
“it is tempting to consider that the nitrogen nucleus lies, at any given time, on a 
well-defined side of the plane of the three protons, and that it jumps from one side 
to the other at more or less regular intervals of time. Of course, this «naive» view 
is at variance with strict quantum theory, but it is nevertheless very commonly 
used, either for teaching purposes or in popularization papers (see e.g. Anderson 
1972).” (Claverie and Diner 1980: 74). 
We want to stress that we do not agree with the qualification “naïve”: the fact that an 
explanation is non-quantum does not make it naïve. On the contrary, the nitrogen-inversion 
model gives a chemical significant account of a phenomenon that has been accurately 
measured. What must be stressed is that the nitrogen-inversion model, with the oscillation 
between the two structures, is a semi-classical explanation: a system in a quantum 
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superposition state does not oscillate between the two components of the superposition. More 
precisely:  
“On the classical theory we picture the nitrogen atom flipping back and forth at a 
characteristic frequency of about 24,000 million vibrations per second, or 24,000 
megacycles per second. At any given instant the nitrogen atom is on one side of 
the hydrogens or on the other. From the quantum point of view the nitrogen has at 
a given time a certain probability of being on either side” (Gordon 1958: 42). 
If the issue at stake is the problem of molecular structure, the question is how to explain the 
nonzero value of the electric dipole moment exclusively in quantum terms and, so, semi-
classical descriptions must be excluded. 
When talking about symmetry breaking, it is necessary to be clear about which 
symmetry is broken. Following with the idea of characterizing the problem of molecular 
structure as a case of the quantum measurement problem, Franklin and Seifert need to 
conceive the symmetric ground state of the molecule as a superposition of asymmetric states: 
“the wavefunction representing a superposition of the pyramid and its inversion is the best 
way to describe ammonia in the quantum formalism.” (2020: 22). If the symmetric ground 
state of the ammonia molecule is expressed as a superposition of two asymmetric states 
representing the pyramid and its inversion, the symmetry under consideration is parity 
symmetry, as Anderson immediately specifies regarding his previous explanation: “The 
symmetry involved in the case of ammonia is parity, the equivalence of left- and right-handed 
ways of looking at things” (1972: 394). So, this case is similar to that of optical isomerism: 
here the role of the measuring pointer is played by an observable ˆ zD , “direction of the electric 
dipole moment in z”, whose eigenstates are ( )z  and ( )z  and whose eigenvalues 
( )z  and ( )z  represent the moment pointing “up” and “down” in direction z, respectively. 
Again, asymmetric states ( )z  and ( )z  cannot be eigenstates of the parity-symmetric 
resultant Hamiltonian RĤ  of the molecule: the ground state 0  of RĤ  can be expressed as 
a superposition of those two asymmetric states (see the analogous eq. (5)): 
 0
1
( ) ( )
2
z z      .         (12) 
This can also be conceived as a case of the quantum measurement problem: here the issue is 
to account for the transition from the superposition to one of the asymmetric states, ( )z  
and ( )z , with definite value of 
ˆ
zD , the direction of the electric dipole moment in z. But, 
as in the case of optical isomerism, in the Hilbert space m  corresponding to the molecule 
ˆ
zD  is also a highly degenerate “collective observable”, whose definite value ‒explained by 
solving the quantum measurement problem‒ have no relevance regarding the values of the 
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nuclei’s positions R̂ . Therefore, also in this case, solving the measurement problem explains 
the breaking of parity symmetry, but does not offer a complete solution of the problem of the 
molecular structure 
We stressed the relevance of specifying which symmetry one is talking about because 
Franklin and Seifert confuse parity symmetry, that treated by Anderson, with rotational 
symmetry:  
“The issue explored by Anderson is that quantum mechanics predicts that 
molecules should have certain symmetry properties, which the molecules are 
observed to violate. In the particular example raised, Anderson asks how it is that 
ammonia exhibits an electric dipole, with a preferred direction, when the quantum 
mechanical description is rotationally symmetric –a description with no preferred 
direction and no dipole moment.” (Franklin and Seifert 2020: 14). 
In fact, the rotational symmetry of the resultant Hamiltonian RĤ  is usually considered when 
the problem of molecular structure is discussed, but conceiving rotational symmetry breaking 
as a case of quantum measurement problem cannot be explained as in the previous paragraph: 
the superposition is not given by eq. (12). In order to recover the rotational symmetry that the 
ground state 0  inherits from RĤ , the superposition must include the eigenstates of all the 
observables ˆ zD  defined for the infinite spatial directions, so that 0  is not expressed as eq. 





( , ) ( , ) ( , )c d d
 
                    (13) 
where ( , )c    is a constant with the value 1 . Analogously to the case of isomers discussed 
in the previous section, the symmetry is reconstructed by superposing all the possible 
asymmetries with equal weight. But by contrast to the isomers case, here the superposition is 
experimentally justified: if the direction of the electric dipole moment is measured in all 
spatial directions (for instance, by measurements involving an electric field in such directions), 
the dipole moment will be found oriented in all the directions with the same frequency. 
Therefore, also in this case the experimental identification of the direction of the electric 
dipole moment is a quantum measurement process that “selects” one of the components from 
the whole superposition, now represented by eq. (13). Does it mean that, at least in this case, 
the solution of the quantum measurement problem solves the problem of molecular structure? 
The answer is once again negative: as explained in the previous paragraph, the definite value 
of the direction of the electric dipole moment operator in a particular spatial direction does 
not univocally determine the molecular structure: there are many geometrical dispositions of 
the nuclei that lead to the same direction of the electric dipole moment. In Woolley’s words: 
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“no amount of computational investigation of the full molecular Schr6dinger 
equation could lead to, for example, the familiar chemical idea of ammonia as a 
pyramidal molecule which is inverting, because the two modes of description 
have nothing in common.” (Woolley 1976: 32). 
Finally, it’s time to consider the idea, repeated in several cases, that the isolated 
molecule has no structure and that symmetry breaking is the result of the interaction between 
the molecule and its environment (see, traditionally, Woolley 1978; more recently, Fortin et 
al. 2016, 2018). However, this claim needs to be taken with care, because its soundness 
depends on the particular kind of environment considered. For instance, the case of sugar 
mentioned by Franklin and Seifert is analogous to that of many pharmacological drugs: they 
are chiral, and generally only one of the members of the pair exhibits biological activity. The 
reason is that protein molecules are chiral and, as a consequence, have different reactions with 
the two enantiomers of a chiral sugar or drug molecule. But now the problem is to explain the 
chiral nature of the biological molecules. In general, given the symmetries of a given 
molecule M, if the environment is also composed of molecules, there are only two 
alternatives: (i) the environmental molecules are also symmetric, so they cannot break the 
symmetry of M, or (ii) the environmental molecules break the symmetry of M because they 
are asymmetric, but then the problem is moved one step back because now the asymmetry of 
the environmental molecules cries for an explanation. As Hendry clearly states: 
“The particular form of the symmetry-breaking addition must be justified however, 
and it is quite mysterious how that could work if all one has in the environment 
are more molecules described by Coulombic Hamiltonians. The Coulomb 
Schrödinger equation for an n-molecule ensemble of hydrogen chloride molecules 
has precisely the same symmetry properties as a Coulomb Schrödinger equation 
for a 1-molecule system. If the particular form of the symmetry-breaking addition 
is not justified, then it is just ad hoc: a deus ex machina.” (Hendry 2010: 186). 
Some authors put their faith in decoherence to solve the quantum measurement problem, 
specifically, the problem of definite outcomes. If this were the case, from Franklin and 
Seifert’s perspective decoherence would also solve the molecular problem since they conceive 
it as a particular case of the problem of outcomes. But, as stressed in Section 2, there is a wide 
agreement among physicists and philosophers of physics in that, although decoherence plays 
a central role in the problem of the preferred basis, it does not offer a solution to the problem 
of definite outcomes (the traditional measurement problem). This issue has been discussed in 
detail elsewhere (Fortin et al. 2016) in the case of enantiomers, but the conclusions can be 
extended to other cases of symmetry breaking. Nevertheless, even if one accepted that 
decoherence not only selects the preferred basis but also explains the measurements’ definite 
outcomes, she would not be in a better position regarding the problem of molecular structure 
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for the same reasons as those explained in this and the previous sections: solving the quantum 
measurement problem is not sufficient to solve the problem of molecular structure. 
The assumption that the interaction with the environment is responsible for the breaking 
of the molecule’s symmetries cannot be a mere general idea, but needs to be developed in 
precise physical terms. The molecule has several different symmetries, and each of them 
requires a specific environment able to break each particular one. For example, polarized light 
is an appropriate environment to break the parity symmetry of chiral molecules, and an 
electric field in a particular direction is adequate to break the rotational symmetry that blocks 
the existence of an electric dipole moment. However, it is worth emphasizing again that, 
although in these cases any answer to the quantum measurement problem gives an account to 
the symmetry breaking, such an account does not solve the problem of molecular structure: it 
only explains the definite value of some particular observable, but not the geometry of the 
molecule partially given by the spatial position of its nuclei nor the stability of that geometry. 
The idea that quantum measurement is strongly linked with symmetry breaking is not 
new (see, e.g., Lombardi and Castagnino 2008, Lombardi 2018), even in the case of quantum 
chemistry (Fortin et al. 2016, 2018). What is new in Franklin and Seifert’s paper is the claim 
that “insofar as the measurement problem is solved, the problems of molecular structure are 
resolved as well” (Franklin and Seifert 2020, Abstract). But it is precisely this claim that 
cannot be easily defended.  
6. Conclusions 
An undoubted virtue of the Franklin and Seifert’s article is its contribution to the 
communication between the philosophy of chemistry and the philosophy of physics, which, as 
the authors point out, have a rather small overlap. Another positive aspect is the fact that it 
brings to the fore, once again, the relationships among symmetry, quantum measurement, and 
molecular structure. Nevertheless, the argumentation has weak points when semi-classical 
notions (nitrogen inversion, configurational Hamiltonian) are appealed to in a context that 
should be confined to quantum mechanics, and when the particular symmetry to be broken in 
each case under study is not correctly identified. However, the main limitation of the article is 
that its main claim, expressed in its title ‒“The problem of molecular structure just is the 
measurement problem”‒ is not correctly justified in any of the three cases treated by the 
authors.  
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‒ In the cases of symmetry breaking (Section 5) and of enantiomers (a special case of the first 
one; Section 3), an adequate solution to the quantum measurement problem would explain 
how the different symmetries of the resultant Hamiltonian can be broken through an 
appropriate measurement interaction. Still, a particular symmetry breaking only justifies the 
definite value of the observable involved in that symmetry, but does not explain the 
geometrical disposition of the nuclei in space in order to account for the molecular structure. 
‒ In the general case of isomers (Section 4), the solution of the problem of molecular 
structure is even further away than in the previous case: the fact that certain isomeric 
structures, and not all the possible ones, are empirically observed cannot be explained even 
if one counts with an adequate solution to the quantum measurement problem.  
Franklin and Seifert’s argumentation does not stop in their main claim, but takes one 
more step towards the issue of the relationship between chemistry and physics. In fact, the 
inability of the resultant Hamiltonian to account for the molecular asymmetries has been 
traditionally invoked to argue against the reduction of molecular chemistry to quantum 
mechanics. The authors consider to have shown that, since the problem of molecular structure 
just is the quantum measurement problem, isolated molecules have no structure. Of course, if 
the solution of the measurement problem not only resolved the symmetry problem ‒which we 
are willing to subscribe‒, but also supplied an answer to the whole problem of molecular 
structure, a strong argument for reductionism would be obtained: “the identification of the 
problems of molecular structure as special cases of the measurement problem removes 
significant hurdles facing the reductionist.” (Franklin and Seifert 2020: 25). Nevertheless, this 
is not a case. In fact, although we agree in that the symmetry problem can be successfully 
confronted in quantum terms by solving the measurement problem, we have shown that 
serious in-principle difficulties still remain when trying to reduce molecular structure to 
quantum mechanics. 
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